3
controllable through direct interventions in the foreign exchange markets and bears a stable and
predictable relationship with the price stability as the final target of policy over the medium-term.”
3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of Singapore’s
monetary/exchange rate policy framework, and its operation during the past four decades. Section
3 specifies and estimates a policy reaction function for Singapore. In addition, it provides
robustness checks to test the stability of the exchange rate policy rule’s coefficients. Section 4
summarizes the results and derives implications for monetary policy.
2. Background of Singapore’s Monetary Framework
Singapore's exchange-rate-centered monetary policy framework has helped achieve a track record
of low inflation with prolonged economic growth (see Figure 1). Taking advantage of Singapore's
high saving rate, prudent fiscal policy,
4,5
and substantial foreign reserves, monetary policy has
offset inflation pressures by guiding the exchange rate along an appreciating path. At first sight, a
stable rate of inflation has been associated with an appreciating exchange rate. For instance, in the
early 1980s a combination of oil price shocks and high capital flows intensified inflation pressures
in the economy. However, by appreciating the trade-weighted exchange rate index (TWI) by 30
percent during 1981-1985 (averaging about 5 percent per year), inflationary pressures were
contained.
6
In 1985, Singapore suffered its first recession, caused largely by the deterioration in export
competitiveness, a cyclical downturn in electronics, and the collapse of the construction boom. To
regain competitiveness, a real depreciation was implemented through a reduction in business costs
from a cut in employer pension contributions, and a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate.
The TWI depreciated only by about 16 percent during the 1985-1988 period even though it
depreciated sharply against the Japanese yen and German mark during the period of U.S. dollar
strength following the Plaza Accord. After the economy recovered from the 1985 recession, fear
of renewed inflation prompted the MAS to allow the TWI to appreciate from 1988 through 1997.
3
Monetary Authority of Singapore (2012).
4
Continued fiscal surpluses since 1980, except for 1987 and 2001/02, has released the MAS of the need to finance the
government, allowing it to focus on its primarily responsibility of maintaining price stability.
5
Nadal De Simone (2000) finds that in about 70 percent of the fiscal years between 1967 and 1995, the actual policy
mix in Singapore was a contractionary fiscal policy accompanied by a contractionary monetary policy.
6
Inflation in Singapore ended around 6 percent annually in the period 1981-82, which contrasts with the OECD
average of nearly 11 percent.